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At the end of the twentieth century, the People's Republic of China faces stark trade 
policy choices. Market reforms implemented since 1978 have brought commercial 
strength and bright expectations for future prosperity. However, they have also brought 
China to the point where trading partners insist on commitments to liberal, 
internationally recognized trading principles. These calls come at a time when China is 
seeking to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), is negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements with Europe, United States and its emerging neighbors, and is working out 
the terms of its participation in the ambitious Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum. 
  The issues at stake cannot be settled with small compromises. Rather, they 
entail China's basic acceptance or rejection of the neoclassical economic paradigm. 
Contentious debates are going on within China as well, between reformers and 
conservatives, wealthy provinces and poor. This summary neither weighs in on debates 
nor predicts outcomes. These debates will, however, have critical implications for China 
and the international economic system. Familiarity with recent Chinese reforms helps 
set the stage for an understanding of unfolding developments. The purpose of this 
chronology is to provide that familiarity to readers who are not versed in the Chinese 
economy. 
  The events summarized in this working paper suggest that recent reforms have 
traced a steep curve. The curve is remarkable, especially when economic conditions 




provides a baseline for the reforms by examining circumstances in each sector addressed 
in the chronology as they stood in the late-Mao period (1970-76). 
  During the Mao era, contrary to conservative Western opinion, the Chinese 
economy achieved some successes. The 7-8 percent average annual growth over the 40 
year post-war period suggests a "new rising power," more than the feudal Cold War 
adversary commonly envisioned in the United States (See, e.g., Funabashi, Oxsenberg 
and Weiss 1994, 1). Inflation remained low over the three decades to 1978, budget 
deficits were small, and external imbalances were minor. China entered the reform 
period with minimal foreign debt, in contrast with many developing countries. A policy 
of low foreign debt continues to this day and bolsters China's ability to attract foreign 
investment and borrow on international markets. In important social areas, such as 
health care and literacy, Chinese conditions--on average--improved under Mao. Gains, 
however, were accompanied by set-backs and rising dissatisfaction. As a 1993 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Occasional Paper noted: 
 
[T]he question arises as to the factors that provided the impetus for economic reforms 
and their scope...Although no crisis was apparent at the macroeconomic level, 
there was growing discontent with the system, especially in the rural 
area...Chinese leaders increasingly recognized that unless the technological 
disparity between China and her neighbors was effectively addressed, these 
output gaps [in economic growth] would only widen. (IMF 1993, 6) 
 
The summary of conditions laid out in the next section explains in part the pressures 













In the late Mao period, rural land remained overwhelmingly in public hands, under 
collective management. The system was three-tiered: households were organized into 
production teams, which were organized into brigades, which were ultimately 
organized into communes of 4,000 to 5,000 households.  
  In March 1971, a People's Daily editorial foreshadowed the coming of a "new 
rural economic policy." Based on the premise that China had achieved grain self-
sufficiency through aggressive rural policy measures (the "learn from Dazhai" 
campaign), a shift in the rural economy toward technical expertise and light 
manufacturing was espoused by the Party. In fact, however, large net grain imports 
(notably from Canada and the United States) were required between 1971 and 1974 
(Kraus 1982, 261-2).
2 Moreover, the new rural economic policy, with its emphasis on 
local decision-making, was burdened by other political baggage that eroded its 
effectiveness. 
  Throughout the Cultural Revolution, local grain self-sufficiency had been a 
national objective. This policy stifled comparative advantage in non-grain agriculture, 
forced rural energies to be directed toward inefficient production, stunted manufacturing 
initiatives, and generally depressed total factor productivity. As Lardy (1982) points out, 
the forced reallocation of agricultural resources had a variety of harmful effects, 
including an increase in interregional income differentials. This was ironic, given the 
Communist objective of an egalitarian economy devoid of regional disparities. 
Government supply and purchasing plans were the mechanism by which state cadres 
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It should be noted that each of the sectors chronicled in this paper experienced 
turbulent developments between 1949 and 1978. The conditions described below reflect 
the period 1970-76 (the late Mao period), and do not necessarily reflect prior years. 
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It should also be noted that Chinese national data, upon which western analyses are 
based, are generally unreliable--at best. Extensive correction for error goes on when 










imposed their authority over ostensibly autonomous farm collectives. 
  As in other sectors, the organization of the rural economy reflected a profound 
hostility toward the concepts of specialization and comparative advantage. In refuting 
Soviet admonitions to divide labor among socialist nations, Mao declared: 
 
[Specialization] is not a good idea. We do not suggest this even with respect to our 
own provinces. We advocate all-round development and do not think that each 
province need not produce goods which other provinces could supply. We want 
the various provinces to develop a variety of production to the fullest extent . . . 
The correct method is each doing the utmost for itself as a means toward self-
reliance for new growth, working independently to the greatest possible extent, 
making a principle of not relying on others . . . (Mao 1977, 102-3; after Riskin 
1987, 206) 
 
  The basis for this declaration was more political than economic. The manner in 
which self-sufficiency was carried out in the rural economy (as elsewhere) entailed a 
consensual and highly inefficient style of decision-making. Consecutive waves of 
revolutionary ardor in the rural sector left little vestige of markets to guide resource 
allocation. The cultural revolution, meanwhile, fractured the central planning 
bureaucracy (which was Mao's intention, according to many scholars). What was left was 





Industrial sector conditions and policies in the late Mao period were as disorganized as 
those in the rural and agricultural area. In short, state control and ideology dominated 
industrial decisions, with the result that the gap not only between China and the 
developed world, but also with its Asian neighbors, was widening rapidly. China's basic 
industrial infrastructure and output were not performing commensurate with the Party's 
ambitions. 
  A number of specific industrial sector policies typical of the pre-reform era were 
criticized by Deng Xiaoping himself in a mid-1970s policy paper known as the "Twenty Points."
3 His key objections to existing conditions were: 
 
• Excessive Chinese reliance on domestic production to the exclusion of superior 
imported technology, accompanied by a rejection of foreign trade credits. 
 
• Refusal to permit enterprise management on the basis of production efficiency 
rather than ideology, coupled with a prejudice against specialization. 
 
• The continued prohibition against worker incentives based on "work intensity, 
ability and magnitude of contribution." Material incentives were still considered 
"bourgeois." 
 
• A failure to ensure that the major 1970-73 decentralization of industrial 
enterprises was managed for the public good. While Deng encouraged 
decentralization, he was concerned that the devolution of responsibility was 
leading to local level corruption, even in important industrial enterprises. 
 
• The problem that "redness" was still held in higher regard than "expertise." For 
example, engineering prowess was not the sole basis on which an industrial 
engineer was promoted. 
 
The fact that Deng issued his critique underscores the extent to which Communist Party 
doctrine still held sway in the mid-1970s. Industry had "grown" under Communist 
principles, but "much useless production occurred in response to arbitrary targets" 
(Riskin 1987, 186). 
  In terms of industrial priorities, steel and energy were given the greatest  
priority during the late Mao period. These sectors were seen as both the means of, and 
constraints on, national development. Steel production was significantly expanded, but 
did not totally displace imports. Oil production was seen as a potential source of  
export earnings, and coal production was increased in order to make oil exports 
possible. Many small coal mines were sunk, but the quality of coal produced was low 
and has since contributed to serious environmental degradation representing multi-
billion dollar remediation costs--which may spill over onto neighbors like Japan. 
  Inefficiencies in the Chinese strategy contributed to a failure to meet goals for 
chemical fertilizers, man made fibers and various important light industries. Increased 
demand for many intermediate goods, and the misallocation of resources in the 
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  5industrial sector, helped generate an import boom once trade was moderately liberalized 
by Hua Guofeng in 1977-78. The resulting uncoordinated spending drew harsh criticism 
from Deng. Instituting a more cautious, step-by-step industrial policy was among his 
first objectives in the early reform period.  
 
Financial Sector and Fiscal Reforms 
 
Prior to the reform period, there existed virtually no financial sector in China other than 
the state apparatus for collecting and redistributing taxes. The enormous People's Bank 
of China served these functions as well as settling small balance of payments credits and 
debits with other nations. High rates of saving existed during the pre-reform period and 
helped facilitate subsequent, rapid reforms (IMF 1993, 8). Scholars debate the extent to 
which pre-reform saving patterns were involuntary--reflecting, for example, price 
controls and rationing. 
  During most of the Mao era, the central government collected and redistributed 
the vast majority of local taxes and fees. Except for two experiments with decentralized 
fiscal authority (1958 and 1970), the center maintained control over provincial receipts 
and allocations (Riskin 1987, 212). At extremes, the rich municipality of Shanghai 
retained only 10 percent of its total local revenue in 1972, while the poor province of 
Xinjiang received upwards of 120 percent. Subsidies for the backward interior provinces 
was the general rule under Mao. 
 
Trade and Investment Policy 
 
Trade, like all economic activity, was organized in late Mao China around the principle 
of "self-reliance." This slogan had clear implications for foreign economic relations prior 
to the Deng reforms. It required: 
 
  • Full utilization of domestic resources; 
 






  6• Reliance upon domestic saving; 
 
• Establishment of a comprehensive industrial system in China. 
 
Though foreign economic contacts were not ruled out by this paradigm, they were 
relegated to secondary importance. Self-reliance was invoked by the Party most 
vociferously during inward-looking periods. During more open periods significant 
Soviet assistance flowed to China (notably in the 1950s and early 1960s). The late  
Mao period was extraordinarily inward-looking. Senior officials who favored foreign 
technology were vulnerable to charges of unpatriotic behavior. 
  The two motivations for self-reliance were military security and mastery of 
manufacturing technology. The latter objective was central in the 1970s. In fact, the 
strongest force behind trade expansion between 1970 and 1973 was a desire to acquire 
foreign technology so as to reduce dependance in the future.  With self-reliance  
trickling down to the enterprise level, local managers were anxious to grab the ability  
to manufacture a wider range of products, based on foreign technology and 
intermediates, when the window inched open. The ensuing burst of purchases from 
abroad (an estimated increase of over 80 percent in real terms from 1970 to 1973) led to 
a period of retrenchment and cancelled orders in 1974-75. 
  This cycle recurred in 1976, when the first leader of the post-Mao era, Hua 
Guofeng, once again allowed imports to surge in order to reinvigorate the economy. 
With mounting balance of payment difficulties, China was forced to relax prohibitions 
on foreign borrowing and trade credits. Hua's inexperience in managing this process, 
and Chinese fear of concomitant foreign financial influence, contributed to Deng's 
ascendence in December 1978. 
  In short, the mid-1970s were marked by an attempt by senior Chinese leaders 
to manage a middle passage avoiding both autarky and an open-door. The results were 
chaotic and failed to serve either the purpose of self-reliance in the ideological sense,  
or healthy growth in a market-economy sense. 
 
Special Economic Zones and Regional Opening 
 
Official Chinese policy up to and including the late Mao period of the mid-1970s 




  7income, education and productivity all lagged in the interior relative to the coast. 
Coastal area fiscal revenues were often used to subsidize interior provinces. 
  Prior to the reform period, the Beijing authorities were reluctant to grant 
greater autonomy to the dynamic coastal areas. The notion of special economic zones, 
even if they could attract foreign investment and technological development, was 
antithetical to the political objectives of egalitarianism. But practical leaders, especially 
Deng, were abundantly aware that the coastal areas must be permitted to "guide the 
way" for the rest of the country. Thus, before the end of the Mao era, the conceptual 





China to 1949 
 
For most of recorded history, China has held a dominant place in the world, both 
politically and economically. As late as 1830 China accounted for 30 percent of world 
manufacturing output (Mathiessen 1991). China only ceased to be the world's largest 
economy in 1850, when Britain took the economic lead. For the next century, China's 
economic and political power declined. The ruling monarchy was weakened and 
ultimately collapsed, "unequal" trade treaties were forced upon China by the western 
powers, and the country was undermined by civil and international wars. China's 
decline in relative terms was stark compared to the rapidly industrializing western 
powers and an emerging Japan (See, e.g., Economist, "Global Economy Survey," 10 
October 1994, S9). Beside the long tenure of Chinese regional hegemony, however, 
many consider this weakness an anomaly.   
  While nineteenth century events are ancient history by American standards, 
they continue to have relevance to current events in China. For example, the venerable 
Hong Kong merchant house Jardine Matheson was instrumental in the Opium War 
(1839-42), in which Chinese markets were forced open by Britain. That memory is  
still recalled today as China prepares to take control of Hong Kong in 1997, and 




  8recently moved its headquarters to Bermuda and its exchange listing to Singapore. 
  In the nineteenth century, industrial activity occurred in pockets, each having 
different characteristics. In Shanghai light manufacturing emerged; in the northeast, 
heavy industry was launched by the Japanese in the 1930s; meanwhile, the coastal areas 
showed some commercial development. Agricultural techniques remained much as they 
had been centuries earlier.  
  After the mid-1800s, the central government steadily ceded power to a host of 
warlords and foreign nations. The Communist Party's People's Army emerged to unite 
the mainland, under the direction of Mao Zedong, in 1949. 
 
From Revolution to Reform, 1949-76 
 
With the evacuation in 1949 of the Kuomintang (KMT) to Taiwan--the last remaining 
domestic rival to Communist authority--China was united under consolidated 
leadership without foreign incursion for the first time in almost a century. However, the 
coming four decades of socialist ideology and the personality-cult leadership of Mao 
were bloody and chaotic. 
 
1949-1951  Chairman Mao attempts to solidify rule, shifting somewhat from a 
military to a civilian footing. However, China soon becomes 
embroiled with the United States over Taiwan and the Korean War, 
which bolsters the military and sets the country on an anti-western, 
pro-Soviet stance. 
 
1952-1957  During these years of institution building and land reform, the Soviet 
Union extends loans, builds turn-key factories, and offers technical 
training and planning advice. China's first Five-Year Plan entails the 
forced provision of cheap agricultural supplies to cities--though per-
capita allocation is kept low to discourage urbanization. In rural areas, 
production decisions are shifted from households to "mutual aid 
teams," and then to cooperatives where a cadre makes key decisions. 
Ownership is redefined in the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and collectivized farms. 
 
In terms of financial structure, the binding constraints on households 
and enterprises at this time are coupons, authorizations, and orders to 
deliver. These instruments rather than money determine production 




  9importance. 
 
The Hundred Flowers campaign brings unanticipated criticism, 
especially from intellectuals, which Mao silences in the repressive "anti-
rightist campaign." 
 
1958-1960  The "Great Leap Forward" (GLF) is advanced by Mao to instill zeal 
and elicit stronger growth. As part of this push for hierarchical 
organization and revolutionary thinking, Mao initiates the People's 
Commune Movement to foster a communist-agrarian society. Bad 
incentives and bad weather bring the famine of 1960 with its 
accompanying economic turmoil, starvation, and rural revolt. 
Twenty to thirty million people lose their lives through malnutrition 
and famine (Fairbanks 1987, 296). The failure of the GLF and the 
People's Commune Movement creates the first open split within the 
ranks of communist leaders. Furthermore, a major rift opens with the 
Soviets, leading to a break in relations--and Russian aid flows. 
 
1961-1965  Premier Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun alter China's policy direction. 
Sectoral priorities during the Great Leap--heavy industry, light 
industry, then agriculture--are reversed, to produce more food (Riskin 
1987, Ch. 7). Private plots are reestablished, limited markets are 
reopened, and modern inputs such as chemical fertilizers are 
emphasized (Barnett 1974, 126). The economy shows signs of 
recovery in 1963, and by 1965 China regains the level of production 
reached in 1957 (USITC 1985, 11-25). 
 
1966-1969  Again striving to expand his command over the Party, Mao 
orchestrates the "Cultural Revolution." Early stages of the movement 
entail a struggle against the so called "antiparty clique," including Liu 
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao calls on the youth as "Red Guards" 
to spread revolutionary zeal. They make a specialty of attacking 
professionals and intellectuals, and wreak havoc on the educational 
system. Begun as a political struggle, the Cultural Revolution 
paralyzes normal life and throws the economy into turmoil. 
  
1970-1976  As fervor turns to a realization that China is falling behind, a more 
pragmatic climate emerges. Premier Zhou Enlai concludes that 
Chinese industry needs foreign technology and seeks to improve 
China's economic relations with other countries. Reestablished 
diplomatic relations with Japan set the stage for Japanese-backed 
industrial projects. China turns to Europe for fertilizers. However, self-
sufficiency is still stressed at the commune level. 
In 1972, US President Richard Nixon visits Beijing and signs the 
Shanghai Communique, paving the way for China to import US 
technology. Moreover, this is an inescapable signal that pragmatism 









1976    The death of Chairman Mao in September finally ends the Cultural 
Revolution. His death also ends the second purge of Deng Xiaoping, 
who had been branded a "counter-revolutionary revisionist" earlier in 
the year when his powerful patron Zhou Enlai died. Mao's death triggers 
a succession struggle, ultimately resulting in a moderate coalition 
directed by the weak Hua Guofeng. 
 
Overview of the Reform Period (1976-Present) 
 
Premier Hua Guofeng's Ten-Year Development Plan is designed to reinvigorate the 
economy, partly through foreign trade. The plan results in a surge in capital goods 
imports, which causes China to encounter serious balance of payments problems. The 
difficulties force the leadership to abandon ideological opposition to borrowing from 
abroad. As part of its new stance, China establishes incentives and regulations to 
attract and govern foreign investment. Economic complications, however, do not 
subside, and demands for stronger economic leadership lead to Deng's return. 
 
1978  The Ten-Year Development Plan, poorly managed and wasteful, falls 
behind schedule. At the December Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, Deng prevails over Hua. 
The plenum adopts a platform of greater reliance on market forces 
which Deng had been elaborating for years. Also at this meeting, the 
Cultural Revolution is reassessed to be a national disaster, with Mao 
himself deemed as only "70 percent good." Deng's guiding philosophy 
is that capitalist techniques can be put to good use in a socialist 
economy, and thesis tested from this point forward. 
 
First Phase (1978-1984) 
 
The initial phase of reform focuses on agriculture and an attempt to balance foreign 
economic relations. Procurement prices for agricultural products are increased; crop 
diversification and specialization are encouraged; restrictions on trade fairs are relaxed; 
and decentralized farm organization is explored (IMF 1993, 3). Preferential policies are 
conferred on special economic zones (SEZs) to attract foreign investment and 
technology, to promote exports, and to create laboratories for broader market-oriented 





1980  (September) Long-time Deng ally Zhao Ziyang is elevated to Premier, 
and advocates faster growth. Embracing the theory of comparative 
advantage, Zhao exhorts China to abandon the idea of self-sufficiency 
(Riskin 1987, Ch. 13). 
 
1982  Deng and British Prime Minister Thatcher meet in Beijing; her 
proposal for continued British administration of Hong Kong is rejected 
by China.  
  
In December the Sixth Five-Year Plan is adopted. The first plan put 
forth under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang, it is premised on continued progress towards a market 
economy (USITC 1985, 26-27). 
  
Second Phase (1984-1988) 
 
Building on the success of rural reforms, Beijing turns to reform urban industries 
dominated by monolithic and inefficient state enterprises. To attract foreign capital and 
technology, 14 major cities are opened to foreign firms (IMF 1993, 3). China is 
progressing toward development goals, but social and fiscal problems are booming as 
well. 
 
1984  The Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong is signed by Zhao and 
Thatcher. Hong Kong is to become a Special Administrative Region of 
China in 1997, enjoying significant autonomy except in foreign and 
defense affairs, and keeping its economic system, separate customs 
status and independent finances for 50 years. 
 
1985  The agricultural procurement system is switched from a mandatory 
purchase quota system to a voluntary contract procurement system. 
 
1986  The "Contract Responsibility System" is implemented: enterprises are 
required to pay a set amount of profits to the government but may 
retain profits above the contract requirement. A labor contract system is 
also introduced for new recruits to state-owned enterprises. 
 
Third Phase (1989-1991) 
 
The economy heats-up from successful earlier efforts to spur demand and production. As inflation reaches double-digits in 1988 and social dislocations from reforms multiply, 
new rounds of price reforms are delayed. Booming investment continues to fuel 
inflation and urban anxiety, however. These social conditions contribute to the climate 
of Tiananmen Square in the Spring of 1989; to the government's decision to brutally 
repress civil protest; and to a policy of retrenchment and "rectification" to follow. 
 
1989  The massacre at Tiananmen Square is followed by strong measures to 
cool the economy, to alleviate negative social externalities, along with 
renewed political campaigns to suppress dissent. 
 
1990   Overcooling leads to the risk of economic crisis, so fiscal and 
monetary stimuli are applied to reverse the economic slowdown. 
 
1991  Fairly stable prices toward the end of the period allow authorities to 
liberalize prices for some goods (IMF 1993, 3). By 1991 the economy 
shows signs of recovery. 
 
Fourth Phase (1992-Present) 
 
This period is marked by a return to reform and opening. The market system is 
pronounced compatible with Chinese socialism. Moves are made to develop a market-
oriented legal and regulatory framework and to redefine the role and functions of 
government. Liberalization falters, however, when it comes to implementing concrete 
steps to address, inter alia, bank failures, intellectual property rights violations, and 
demands for free flow of economic information.  
 
1992  (January) Deng, visiting southern China, calls for acceleration of 
growth, reform, and opening up (IMF 1993, 3). 
 
(March) The authorities declare an end to the 1988 "rectification 
program" of centrally imposed price controls. 
 
(October) The Communist Party formally endorses Deng's view that 
the market system is compatible with socialism, and calls for the 
establishment of a "socialist market economy." 
 
1993  After formal adoption of "socialist market economy" language, 
conflicting policy goals issue from Beijing over the year. Some like 
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji advocate austerity and restrained 









1994  Attempts to tinker with remaining socialist precepts continue in an 
effort to maintain growth without attendant social dislocations and 
pain. Exchange rates are unified, Labor Law is issued, SOE reforms are 
announced for 18 cities. But problems continue to grow as well. 
Foreign investment offsets monetary policies and inflation remains 
high, while WTO accession plans derail. 
 
1995  China tries to steer middle course between partners desire to see 
liberalization in exchange for WTO-membership, and domestic social 
pressures and political demands such liberalization might cause. 
Forthcoming leadership transition preoccupies senior initiative, and 
further realignment of Chinese policy seems unlikely until the dust 
from this process settles. Slightly lower growth and inflation indicate a 
softer-landing, and may buy the time to sort out the politics internally. 
However, foreign pressure builds to nail-down Chinese commercial 
obligations. 
 
THE RURAL ECONOMY 
 
1979  Several reforms in rural markets are introduced: 
• Procurement prices of agricultural products are significantly 
increased, and diversification and specialization are encouraged. 
• Experiments are begun with the private tenure system (also known as 
the Household Responsibility System), with private plots enlarged. 
Under this system, those who hold a plot are obliged to supply part of 
the output to collective procurement, but they may consume extra 
output or sell it in free markets. 
• Restrictions on rural markets and nonagricultural activity by farmers 
are relaxed (IMF 1993, 16-17).  
 
early 1980s  In the process of agricultural deregulation, township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) boom. From the start they are permitted to sell 
their products at market prices and to retain their own profits (unlike 
industrial enterprises discussed in the next sector). Worker incentives 
are bolstered as TVE wages are tied to productivity. TVEs account for 
about half of rural GDP (IMF 1993, 17).  
 
1984    A "two-track pricing system" is first introduced for agricultural 
products, to be applied to industrial goods soon thereafter. Under this 
system, farmers receive set procurement prices for output they are 
required to produce; if they produce beyond that level, they may sell 
their goods at market prices. Meanwhile, the contract period for the 
lease of private plots is extended from 5 years to 15 years for annual 
crops (in 1994, this period was again extended to 30 years), and to 50 
years for tree crops (IMF 1993, 16-17).  
 1985  The procurement system is switched from a mandatory purchase quota 
system to a voluntary contract procurement system. A major purpose  
is to alleviate the fiscal burden arising from agriculture procurement 
and resale operations, which are both inefficient and entail higher 
prices for rural procurement than for urban resale. The switch leads to 
an immediate drop in grain production (IMF 1993, 16-17).  
 
late 1980s  The state enlarges its investment in agriculture, and procurement 
prices are raised. Grain output reaches a new peak in 1990, giving 
political impetus to a support mechanism based on market prices (IMF 
1993, 16-17). 
 
1990  A national trading center for grains is established in Zhengzhou, in 
Henan Province. Agricultural wholesale markets, such as the rice 
markets in Jiujiang and Wuhu, are developed to curtail the role of the 
state in agricultural procurement. By 1992, some 72,000 local markets 
are open throughout the country (IMF 1993, 16-17). 
  
1991-1992   • Large percentage increases are implemented in agricultural ration 
prices for urban areas, letting urban sales prices reflect procurement 
prices. 
• Grain prices are first decontrolled in Guangdong and Fujian. By 
May 1993, decontrolled grain prices are effective in about 2000 cities 
and counties, accounting for about 80 percent of the country (IMF 
1993, 16-17). 
 
1993  Farmers continue to be caught by rising costs of seeds, fertilizer, and 
pesticides, which outpace increases in procurement prices (EIU Profile 
1995, 28). 
 
1994  Amid summer flooding in parts of the South and droughts in parts of 
the North and West, output of grain falls. In response to rises in food 
prices due to the natural disasters, the authorities increase procurement 
prices by 40 percent for grain, 60 percent for cotton (EIU Report   1995, 
22). At December's Central Economic Work Conference, the 
government reaffirms the central role of agriculture in China's 
development plans (EIU Report 1995, 22). 
 
1995  (February) While statistics indicate that land area used for farming is 
shrinking as remote regions turn to forestry and herding, the government 
maintains a 500m tons/year grain target for 2000, admitting that this 
goal will require large fiscal outlays for inputs and technology (EIU 
Report 1995, 1 and 22). Despite the negative assessment of foreign 
experts, Xie Zhenhua of the State Environmental Protection Bureau 
declares at an international conference that "China can feed itself" (EIU 





  151996  (January) The failure of talks with the United States over agricultural 
sector trade underscores deep Chinese anxieties over the stability of 
the rural economy (IUST, 26 January 26 1996, 10). Concerns over 
food dependence and the flood of rural workers to the cities stiffen 
Chinese resistance to rural economic reforms.  
 
THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR  
 
1983  For state-owned enterprises, direct taxation replaces the automatic 
transfer of profits to the budget. Previously, enterprises handed over all 
earnings to the state budget and in turn relied on transfers from the 
budget both to cover losses and to provide funds for investment. 
Enterprises are gradually given greater authority over their own after-
tax profits (IMF 1993, 18-20).  
 
1984  The "two-track pricing system," which was first introduced in rural 
areas, is extended to a wide range of industrial commodities. Under 
this system, products are sold to the state up to the quota amount at a 
fixed price; the above-quota amount is then sold either on the open 
market or to the state at negotiated prices. Over the ensuing years, the 
proportion of goods subject to mandatory pricing is gradually 
diminished; by 1988, market prices are in effect for 53 percent by value 
of retail sales (IMF 1993, 18-20). 
  
1986  The extent of day-to-day government micromanagement of enterprises is 
reduced via introduction of a "Contract Responsibility System." Under 
this system, enterprises are required to pay a set amount of profits to the 
government, but they can dispose of their profits surpassing the contract 
requirement (IMF 1993, 18-20; Takayanagi 1993, 74). 
 
A labor contract system is instituted for all newly recruited workers in 
the state-owned enterprises. At the contract's expiration, both the 
enterprise and the employee are free to choose whether to extend or 
terminate the contract. Terms and conditions of work are determined 
by individual contracts. At the end of 1992, 21 percent of total 
employees in state-owned enterprises work under the contract system 
(IMF 1993, 18-20). Meanwhile, an unemployment insurance scheme is 
set up to provide benefits to unemployed workers (IMF 1993, 18-20). 
  
A Bankruptcy Law is enacted. It is rarely applied in the early years 
due to strong worker resistance and a public commitment to 
guaranteed employment. However, in 1992 and 1993, the law is 
applied more rigorously both because public attitudes change and 
because the unemployment insurance scheme is better established and 
funded. Some 66 enterprises are declared bankrupt in the first half of 





  161988    (April) The Constitution is amended, permitting private firms to 
operate as a complement to the socialist economy. Previously, only 
individual firms employing no more than seven people as assistants 
were allowed to operate. The seven employee limit is now 
discontinued (Yabuki, 1992, 58). 
    
An Enterprise Law is enacted to transform state-owned enterprises into 
fully autonomous legal entities, responsible for their own profits and 
losses (IMF 1993, 18-20). 
 
1991  The authorities announce 20 measures, 12 of which are designed to 
improve the operations of state-owned enterprises, such as tax 
concessions and preferential access to bank credit; other measures are 
aimed at facilitating the emergence of market forces surrounding state-
owned enterprises, such as a reduction in mandatory planning (IMF 
1993, 18-20). 
 
1992  (July) The authorities publish "Regulations on Transforming the 
Operating Mechanism of State-Owned Enterprises" to give effect to  the 
Enterprise Law. Under the regulations, state enterprises shall enjoy 14 
rights, including the right to decide what to produce, how to price and 
market their products, how to invest their funds, the right to hire and 
fire workers, and the right to determine wage policy. In exchange for 
these rights, enterprises must answer for their financial performance, 
and inefficient firms are expected to restructure or shut down in 
accordance with the Bankruptcy Law (IMF 1993, 27-28). 
 
(September) The authorities announce price liberalization for a large 
number of industrial inputs, representing over four-fifths of goods 
previously under control (IMF 1993, 18-20). 
 
(November) The time frame for eliminating the two-track pricing 
system is compressed to the next three to five years. The proportions 
of producer and consumer goods subject to price controls are reduced 
to 20 percent and 10 percent respectively in 1992 (IMF 1993, 27-28).  
 
1993  Private and foreign-invested enterprises contribute 10.8 percent of 
industrial output, up from 8.3 percent in 1992; state-owned enterprises 
account for 52.2 percent of output, down from 60.5 percent in 1992; 
collectives make up 36.5 percent, up from 31.4 percent in 1992 (EIU 
Profile 1995, 26). 
 
1994  Subsidies and bail-outs for state-owned enterprises continue to strain 
the fiscal budget. Because SOEs provide health care, housing and 






  171995  Most government estimates say 40-50 percent of SOEs are losing 
money. However, in January, Zhu Rongji notes that SOE losses 
amount to only one-third of SOE profits, and claims that the majority 
of the loss-makers are small and medium sized enterprises. Therefore 
the number of SOEs operating at a loss may be large, but the total 
assets and workers the group represents amounts to just 20 percent of 
the entire SOE sector (EIU Report 1995, 21). Zhu may have down-
played the extent of losses to garner support for further reforms. 
 
From mid-year, there are signs that senior leaders will restrict the flow 
of state bank funds to loss-making SOEs. SOEs unable to show a 
positive net present value for their projects will receive working  
capital only, not long-term funding. This responds in part to charges 
that SOEs take their state funds and re-invest them in higher return, 
higher risk ventures. 
 
FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 
1979-1983  For the first few years of the reform period, the People's Bank of   
China continues to act as a monobank, functioning as both a central 
bank and a commercial bank. Funds are allocated in accordance with 
the state plan, with emphasis on output rather than profitability, which 
results in severe mismanagement. Three other specialized banks are 
also permitted to operate: in agriculture, the Agricultural Bank of 
China; in state construction, the People's Construction Bank; and in 
foreign exchange management, the Bank of China (IMF 1993, 21-22).  
 
1981  The first treasury bonds are issued and sold on a compulsory basis to 
enterprises and individuals (IMF 1993, 21-22). 
 
1982  The issuance of enterprise shares is started on an experimental basis 
for private firms in 1982, and for state enterprises in 1985. These 
shares do not convey rights of ownership, but they do pay interest or 
dividends (IMF 1993, 21-22). 
 
1984    The People's Bank of China narrows its operations to those of a   
central bank, and the newly created Industrial and Commercial Bank 
takes over the commercial banking function of the People's Bank (IMF 
1993, 21-22). 
 
1985  (April) Foreign banks are permitted to set up branches and local 
subsidiaries and to establish joint ventures with Chinese partners in the 
special economic zones (Nomura Research Institute, 1995). 
 
1986    Specialized banks are permitted to conduct foreign transactions, and 




  18(IMF 1993, 21-22). Urban and rural credit cooperatives are established 
as alternative banks; they number more than 60,000 by the decade's 
end. 
 
mid 1980s  The China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), 
established in 1979, becomes the country's major consulting firm and 
investment bank. Other trust and investment companies, which are 
often called ITICs (International Trust and Investment Corporations; 
not organizationally linked to CITIC), expand rapidly; they provide 
trust, consultant and investment services similar to CITIC's (IMF  
1993, 21-22). 
  
1987  The Bank of Communication, a major financial institution in pre-1949 
China that was forced to close down (except for one Hong Kong office 
that maintained operations as part of the Bank of China group), is 
reestablished. It begins expanding its branch networks, spurring more 
extensive interbank competition. 
 
1990  Restrictions on lending to non-priority sectors are eased, and 
provincial branches of the People's Bank are allowed some discretion 
to allocate credit among commercial banks (IMF 1993, 21-22). 
 
(November) The first securities exchange is established in Shanghai 
(IMF 1993, 21-22).  
 
1991  (June) The second securities exchange is established in Shenzhen. 
 
1992    Foreigners are allowed to purchase and sell "B" shares, which are 
issued by some enterprises. Shares that are limited to purchase and 
sale by domestic residents are called "A" shares (CIA 1993; IMF 
1993, 14). 
 
Reform of the banking system is planned to transform the specialized 
banks into competitive, accountable commercial entities. The main 
components of the reform are: 
•  Separating commercial and policy-based lending; 
•  Requiring all loans to pay market interest rates, and providing 
interest subsidies for priority projects through the budget; 
•  Encouraging banks to do better loan assessment and portfolio 
management (IMF 1993, 31). 
 
1993  (January) The State Council Securities Committee is established to 
improve the regulation of securities markets (CIA, 1993). 
 
(November) The authorities announce plans to create three banks to 
support industrial, agricultural and infrastructure projects that may not 




  19development. The idea is to free the country's commercial banks from 
the burden of financing these projects. 
 
1994  (January) The authorities declare that foreign banks will soon be 
allowed to expand their branch networks, and five foreign banks will 
also be permitted to conduct local currency transactions. Currently, 
branching is permitted in 13 cities and economic zones. Beyond these 
zones, banks can open representative offices but may not carry on 
profit-making activities. Wherever they operate, foreign banks are 
limited to foreign exchange investment and guarantees; foreign 
exchange deposits and joint venture loans; and import or export 
account settlement.  
 
(May) In an effort to facilitate the Hong Kong reunification process of 
1997, the Bank of China begins issuing currencies in Hong Kong, 
joining Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank and Standard Chartered Bank, the 
previous two note-issuing commercial banks in Hong Kong. Circulation 
of Hong Kong dollars is also to be officially sanctioned in Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai, two of the special economic zones. 
 
(August) Shandong Huaneng Power Development becomes the first 
Chinese company to have a primary listing on the New York Stock 
Exchange. As such, it is the first of four power companies to launch 
international public offerings, being dual-listed on the Hong Kong and 
New York Stock Exchanges.  
 
1995  Equity listings in Hong Kong (and elsewhere outside China) are 
performing poorly. Further IPOs are held up as the market rethinks 
the worth of H shares (Economist, 16 September 1995, 88). 
 
(August) China admits that 1 in 5 state bank loans is overdue; 
unofficial reports put the figure much higher. Reforms are enacted to 
free commercial banks from state mandated lending obligations, the 
so-called "policy loans." In addition, the reforms are supposed to free 
the People's Bank of China (BOC) to attend to traditional central 
banking responsibilities. New banks--Export & Import, State 
Development, and Agriculture Development-are supposed to address 
specific national needs, while "policy banks" continue to subsidize the 




pre-1980  All public revenues are remitted to the central government and then 
distributed to the provinces in accordance with expenditure plans 
approved by the center (IMF 1993, 20). 
  








are three types of taxes: 
• Taxes accruing to the center; 
• Taxes accruing to the localities; 
• Revenue that is allocated among the center and localities (IMF 1993, 
48). 
      
1985  A new arrangement is designed to create incentives for revenue 
collection by each province: the province's permitted expenditures 
depend in part on its budget balance in the previous year. However, 
the central government maintains its tight control over the greatest 
revenue-yielding areas, such as Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin (IMF 
1993, 48). 
 
1988  A new fiscal contract system introduces six types of revenue sharing, 
further increasing the portion of revenue retained by localities (IMF 
1993, 48).  
 
1993  (November) The authorities announce a plan to reform the tax revenue 
sharing system. The new scheme allots a larger share of public revenues 
to the central government. 
 
1994    (January) A new tax system is implemented whereby the central 
government claims more than 60 percent of total tax revenues. Other 
features of the system include: 
• A uniform 33 percent tax rate on enterprise profits, replacing the 55 
percent rate previously levied on large- and medium-sized state firms; 
• The imposition of a value-added tax following international practice; 
• The introduction of a uniform personal income tax system, to be 
applied to foreigners as well as Chinese citizens; 
• A new tax on real property transactions, along with new taxes on 
stock exchange dealings, inheritances and insurance.  
 
1995    The government claims that the tax collection process in 1994 was a 
success, but the Ministry of Finance notes that "financial revenue" grew 
by 18.9 percent while expenditure grew at 22.1 percent (EIU Report 
1995, 17). The government attempts to trim expenditure through 
administrative means: SOEs are told that spending without restraint 
will bring harsh penalties (EIU Report 1995, 17), and local 
governments are ordered to limit spending. 
 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 
SYSTEM
 
pre-1978  China's foreign trade is conducted by 12 state-owned Foreign Trade 
Corporations (FTCs), which procure and trade the quantities directed 
by the central plan. The state budget absorbs all profits and losses. 




between the FTCs and the domestic enterprises with which they deal, 
the underlying purpose being to favor some transactions and disfavor 
others. Under the oversight of the State Administration of Exchange 
Control (SAEC), a retention system is established, under which 
exporters surrender their actual foreign exchange and are issued 
retention quotas by SAEC equivalent to a proportion of their foreign 
exchange earnings (IMF 1993, 33-37). 
 
1979    Reformers acknowledge that foreign investment can bring China 
technology transfer, management training, capital, foreign exchange 
earning potential, infrastructure development and more. To attain these 
benefits the leadership begins implementing more investment-friendly 
laws. The Joint Venture Law (JVL) is adopted to provide limited 
liability and to allow companies to be considered "legal persons." 
However, the JVL is rigid, requiring that the central government 
approve all JVs; that the presidents of joint ventures be PRC nationals; 
that major corporate acts have unanimous board approval; that the  joint 
venture be of fixed duration (10 and 30 years, extendable with 
permission); that dissolution only occur in special circumstances, with 
approval; that all owners consent to the transfer of an investment; and 
that profits be distributed in accordance with registered capital amounts 
(Feinerman,  5). 
 
However, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) enjoy greater flexibility for 
attracting FDI. (See the section on Special Economic Zones.) 
 
1981  (January) A single exchange rate is set for the internal settlement of 
trade transactions; this rate is 2.8 yuan per dollar, while the official 
exchange rate stands at 1.53 yuan per dollar. National enterprises are 
allowed to sell their retention quotas to other national enterprises that 
participate in the retention quota system. The Bank of China serves as a 
broker in these sales (IMF 1981, 107). Over the ensuing 3 years, the 
official exchange rate is progressively devalued, and in 1984 the rates 
are unified at a rate of 2.8 yuan per dollar (IMF 1993, 33-37). 
 
1982  The new constitution promises to protect "the lawful rights and 
interests of foreign investors." 
 
1983  SEZs experiment with the first Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
(WFOEs). In addition to allowing complete foreign ownership of 
investments in China, the WFOEs have autonomy to determine their 
own production and business plans, which have fewer reporting 
requirements. Also, they are allowed to conclude their own labor 
contracts. A WFOE may be a legal person and is assured of protected 
profits; however, WFOEs face stiff rules for technology transfer, 
export performance and lines of business, and they do not enjoy 
limited liability (Feinerman, 2).  
1984  Fourteen coastal cities are designated Economic and Technical 
Development Zones to attract FDI (See the section on Special 
Economic Zones). 
 
1986  (July) China formally applies to join the GATT. Because of the wide-
ranging implications of China's membership for the world trading 
system, a GATT Working Group delays resolving the issue through 
1994 (US-China Business Council 1992). 
 
(November) A dual exchange rate is resurrected with the establishment 
of the Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centers (FEACs). At these centers, 
approved enterprises may buy and sell retention quotas. However, the 
FEAC exchange rate (the swap market exchange rate) is set by the 
authorities, and only foreign-funded enterprises may participate (IMF 
1993, 33-37). 
 
1988    (April) The Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual (Cooperative) Joint 
Ventures (CJV) is promulgated to offer greater flexibility to investors 
than permitted by the WFOE law. As a CJV, a company can have 
limited liability and legal person status. There are fewer restrictions 
governing the relations between CJV owners, and profits may be shared 
according to contractual arrangement rather than on the basis of equity 
interests. There are no limits on a CJV's duration, and no minimum 
percentage of foreign capital is required. However, this form of FDI 
entails two drawbacks: higher tax rates and restrictions on the 
repatriation of capital. Still, varying local regulations add to costs of 
doing business (Feinerman,  18). 
 
The Draft Plan for Restructuring the Foreign Trade System is passed to 
foster greater market-orientation through functional decentralization. 
The roles of the Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs) and the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) are diminished, 
and more decision power is handed to private firms and SOEs, as well 
as to provincial and local governments. 
 
Access to the FEACs is extended to all enterprises having foreign 
exchange retention quotas. Meanwhile, authorities decontrol the swap 
market exchange rate, allowing buyer and seller negotiations to 
determine the rate (IMF 1993,  33-37). 
 
1989  By this time, most local branches of the 12 national Foreign Trade 
Corporations (FTCs) are operating as independent entities. Thus there 
are now about 4,000 independent FTCs. As such, they are responsible to 
local authorities for their financial performance (IMF 1993, 33-37). 
 








China objects, contending that it should become a full member before 
Taiwan (US-China Business Council, 1992). 
 
1990  (April) Amendments to the basic JVL are designed to increase investor 
confidence. New provisions include broader terms for tax holidays, 
foreign exchange, and duration as well as no expropriation without 
appropriate compensation. Also, foreigners are allowed to be chairmen 
of joint venture boards. Investors still have reason to be skeptical, 
however, as problems persist regarding hiring flexibility, supplies of 
inputs, price controls, credit restrictions, and more (Feinerman, 17). 
 
1991  (January) All direct export subsidies to FTCs are removed (IMF 1993, 
33-37). 
 
The Foreign Tax Law is passed to give clear and unified tax treatment to 
investors (Peck,  12). 
 
(December) All domestic residents are permitted to sell foreign exchange 
(e.g., acquired as remittances) at designated bank branches at swap rates 
(IMF 1993, 33-37). 
 
1992  In January, Deng's "walk in the South" signals approval for functional 
decentralization and greater contact with the west. At the Fourteenth 
National Congress in October, the Communist Party formally 
embraces Deng's push for greater market orientation, calling for China 
to become a "socialist market economy" (CIA 1993). 
  
(April) In the effort to reduce market barriers, the "import adjustment 
tax" on most commodities, a form of tariff, is eliminated (CIA 1993). 
  
(October) The authorities announce reform plans in the context of 
negotiations to join the GATT and in bilateral discussions with the 
United States. These plans include: 
• The elimination of two-thirds of China's import licensing 
requirements by the end of 1994, and the liberalization of other non-
tariff measures. 
• The removal of all import restrictions, licensing requirements, 
quotas, and other controls on a wide range of products by 1997.  
• The creation of a more transparent trade system (IMF 1993, 34). 
         
(December) Customs tariffs are reduced by an average of 7.3 
percentage points on 3,371 items, representing 53 percent of dutiable 
items. This is the foremost example of a series of tariff reductions 
(IMF 1993, 34). 
 
1993  (May) President Clinton ties renewal of China's Most Favored Nation 
status to "significant overall progress" in China's respect for human rights. If such progress is not certified by spring 1994, MFN status is 
threatened to be revoked. Chinese officials voice strong opposition to the 
US linking human rights and trade issues.  
 
1994  (January) The two-tiered exchange rate system is unified to reflect 
market forces. The former official rate is abolished and a new, single 
floating rate is adopted, based on swap centers' exchange rates. Shanghai 
prepares to open the National Foreign Exchange Trading Center that 
will electronically link China's major swap markets.  
 
(February) China and the United States launch negotiations for better 
foreign access to the services market in China. 
 
(March) Authorities announce intentions to phase out quotas on most 
categories of imports by 1997. Some 53 import categories--mostly capital 
goods--remain subject to quotas and licenses, but these restrictions will 
be gradually removed over the next three years. 
 
(April) The interbank currency market begins operations, with the 
yuan exchange rate closing at 8.69 yuan to the dollar on its first official 
trading day. However, in an attempt to prevent pressures on the 
interbank currency market in its early phase, foreign funded 
enterprises are still restricted to swap center trading.  
 
(June) The Clinton Administration de-links MFN status for Chinese 
exports and human rights conditions in China. Emphasizing the 
importance of US-China trade and investment relations, Clinton 
renews China's MFN status, while criticizing its human rights record. 
 
1995  Export figures for 1994 show an extraordinary rise of 32 percent. Part 
of the surge is due to the elimination of the dual-exchange rate system, 
in effect a devaluation. Also contributing to the rise are the inflows of 
export-oriented foreign investment of 1992 and 1993. Textiles, 
garments, shoes and toys show the most growth (EIU Report 1995, 2). 
 
New regulations require foreign enterprises to submit an annual 
Foreign Exchange Examination Report detailing their foreign currency 
transactions. Foreign investors are able to exchange currency more 
easily, but they face greater scrutiny each year on the basis of their 
Foreign Exchange Examination Reports (EIU Business China, 15 May 
1995). 
 
The United States takes issue with Chinese violations of intellectual 
property rights and threatens to retaliate under Special 301 procedures. 
China agrees to clamp down on piracy and to provide better market 
access to foreign producers of copyright and trademark products 
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Despite "delinkage" of China's political landscape and MFN status, the 
US Congress raises the possibility of mandated trade penalties over 
human rights considerations. The annual MFN debate in Washington, 
therefore, continues to be a concern for China. 
 
China steps up its WTO accession campaign, showing some flexibility 
on dismantling the trading rights system, export rebates, and other 
practices. The US and EU, initially far from agreement on China's 
protocol, close ranks enough to show dissatisfaction with China's offer 
(IUST, various issues). 
 
(November) The APEC Osaka leaders summit elicits a grade of "B" 
overall, but China makes a strong impression with a pledge to cut 
tariffs on over 4000 items, reduce simple tariffs by an average of 30 
percent, and take other steps (Bergsten 1996, IUST, 24 November 
1995, 9). While these commitments turn out to include a lot of 
"filler," many are nonetheless substantial. However, value added and 
luxury taxes reduce the value of the cuts as well. 
 
(December) Both China and Taiwan give notice of their intentions to 
join the WTO. It is unlikely that either can be considered as founding 
a member (IUST, 5 January 1996, 18). 
 
(December) Beijing announces that import tax exemptions for many 
foreign invested enterprises will be revoked. Exceptions are 
envisioned--for some. 
 
1996  (Late February) The deadline for full implementation of the US-China 
IPR agreement approaches. Unhappy with Chinese compliance up to 
this point, US officials promise "decisive action" if goals are not met 
on schedule (IUST, 5 January 1996). 
 
 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND FURTHER REGIONAL OPENING 
 
  
1979-1980  Four special economic zones (SEZs) are established in the two coastal 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. These areas are Shenzhen (near 
Hong Kong), Zhuhai (near Macao) and Shantou, all in Guangdong, 
and Xiamen (across from Taiwan) in Fujian. Local authorities in SEZs 
are permitted to attract foreign investors through preferential policies; 
they may also undertake their own infrastructure development if they 
can raise the funds. Within the zones, enterprises can make their own 
investment, production and marketing decisions. Foreign funded 
enterprises in the region are accorded preferential tax treatment and  




  26imports (IMF 1993, 38-45). 
 
1984  (April) Some 14 coastal cities are designated Economic and Technical 
Development Zones open to foreign trade and investment. Local 
officials are given the authority to approve construction and industrial 
projects involving foreign investment up to $5 million; later these 
limits are raised to $10 million for Dalian and $30 million for Tianjin 
and Shanghai. Enterprises within the coastal cities enjoy similar tax 
concessions and import duty exemptions. Within this regime, foreign 
direct investment grows rapidly (IMF 1993, 38-45). 
 
1988  Hainan is designated as China's largest SEZ and accorded the status of 
a province. Hainan benefits from cheap labor costs, low land prices, 
and the free movement of capital and merchandise; in some respects, 
Hainan is afforded greater latitude in preferential policies than other 
open economic zones (IMF 1993, 38-45). 
 
1990  (April) Pudong New Area of Shanghai is established. Designated an 
open economic zone, it is to enjoy more flexible policies than those 
already applied in the original SEZs. The authorities intend for 
Shanghai to become a major trading, economic, and financial center 
not only for China, but also for the entire Asian region (IMF 1993, 
38-45). 
  
1992  The central authorities target ten major cities for preferential policies 
and designate six development zones along the Yangtze River valley. 
The strategy for the Yangtze River cities is to integrate their 
development with that of Shanghai's Pudong region. The government 
also grants all provincial capitals and 13 border cities permission to 
adopt similar policies. Most of the incentives offered in the original 
SEZs, Hainan, and Pudong are to be extended to the newly opened 
cities of the inland (IMF 1993, 38-45). 
 
1994  The 1994 tax reforms are designed in large part to capture some of the 
revenue from the coastal areas and redistribute funds to poorer 
provinces. 
 
1995  At the November APEC summit in Osaka, China includes among its 
"downpayments" a pledge to expand "pilot-base" sites for sino-foreign 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 1992, 1994. 
    Harry Harding. 1987. "China's Second Revolution."  
 Brookings,  129. 
 
   
Ta   ble 2. Government Budgetary and Extra-Budgetary Revenue 
  Budgetary   Extra-Budgetary  Extra-Budgetary  Year 
 Revenue   Revenue    Revenue  as  %  of   
 (billions   (billions    Budgetary  Revenue     
an)     yuan)         yu  
 
1982     108.4     80.3    74.1 
1983     121.1     96.8    79.9 
1984     146.7   118.9    81.0 
1985     183.7   153.0    83.3 
1986     218.5   173.7    79.5 
1987     226.2   202.9    89.7 
1988     248.9   227.0    91.2 
1989     280.4   265.9    94.8 
1990     313.4   270.9    86.4 
1991     343.1   324.3    94.5 
19   92     394.4   385.5    97.7 









Table 3a.  Budgetary Expenditure of Central and Local        
Governments (as percentage of total expenditure)     
     Year     Central    Local 
  1982     49.8     50.2 
  1983     49.7     50.3 
  1984     47.8     52.2 
  1985     45.3     54.7 
  1986     41.3     58.7 
  1987     42.1     57.9 
  1988     39.2     60.8 
  1989     36.4     63.6 
  1990     39.8     60.2 
  1991     39.8     60.2 
  1992     41.4     58.6 
     1993     37.0     63.0 







Table 3b.  Extra-Budgetary Expenditures of Central and Local    
Governments (as percentage of total expenditure)     
     Year     Central    Local 
  1982     30.9     69.1 
  1983     34.3     65.7 
  1984     37.7     62.3 
  1985     40.9     59.1 
  1986     40.6     59.4 
  1987     40.3     59.7 
  1988     39.3     60.7 
  1989     39.0     61.0 
  1990     38.3     61.7 
  1991     40.9     59.1 
     1992     43.6     56.4 











Ta   ble 4.  China's Exchange Rate by Year (end of year, yuan/US$) 
 Year    Official  Exchange   Average  Rate  in 
     Rate      FEACs* 
   
 1986     3.7      n.a. 
 1987     3.7      5.9 
 1988     3.7      6.6 
 1989     4.7      5.4 
 1990     5.2      5.7 
 1991     5.4      5.9 
 1992     5.8      7.3 
 1993     5.8      8.7 
 1994     (a)      8.7 
    1995          8.3 
*Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centers (FEACs) are swap centers, established in 
1986 to allow approved enterprises to buy and sell foreign exchange at 
controlled rates. 
(a) The official rate is abolished and the FEAC rate becomes the basis of a 
floating rate. 
 
Sources: IMF, Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions, 
Annual Report, various issues; IMF, International Financial Statistics 




Ta   ble 5. Foreign Direct Investment in China (in billions US$) 
    Year    Contracted  FDI    Utilized  FDI 
 1984         2.7       1.3 
 1985         5.9            1.7 
 1986         2.8       1.9 
 1987         3.7       2.3 
 1988         5.3       3.2 
 1989         5.6       3.4 
 1990         6.6       3.5 
 1991       12.0       4.4 
 1992       58.1     11.0 
    1993     111.4     27.5 
Notes:"Contracting FDI" is the value of approved FDI plans in       that 
year; "utilized FDI" is the amount actually spent        in the year. This 
includes amounts spent under approvals       issued in prior year. 
 










Ta   ble 6. GDP Growth and Inflation for China 
 Year   Percent  change  in: 
       GDP    Consumer  Prices 
 1979      7.6       2.0 
 1980      7.8       7.4 
 1981      4.5       2.5 
 1982      8.3       2.0 
 1983    10.4       1.9 
 1984    14.6       2.7 
 1985    12.9     11.9 
 1986      8.5       7.0 
 1987    11.1       8.8 
 1988    11.2     20.7 
 1989      4.3     16.3 
 1990      3.9       1.4 
 1991      8.0       5.1 
 1992    13.2       8.6 
 1993    13.8     17.0 
 1994    11.8     21.7 
 1995    10.2     17.8 
    1996      9.3     14.6 
Notes: GDP at constant prices; 1994-96 figures are PECC              
estimates. 
 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1994. Pacific 






Table 8a. China's Merchandise Trade Balance with Major  
     Trading  Partners 
  China's Trade Balance (in US$ billions) with*: 
Ye   ar    Hong Kong     US    Japan  EU    World 
1980     3.8    -2.6   -0.8     0.3     -1.4 
1981     4.0    -1.5     0.2     0.5     -0.2 
1982     3.9    -0.4     1.8     0.3       2.9 
1983     4.1      0.3     0.2   -0.1       0.8 
1984     3.8      0.4   -1.3   -0.3     -1.1 
1985     2.4      0.4   -6.1   -2.5   -15.2 
1986     4.2      2.1   -4.2   -2.3   -11.9 
1987     5.3      3.4   -0.9   -0.5     -3.8 
1988     6.2      4.2     0.4     0.9     -7.7 
1989     9.4      7.1     2.6     2.3     -6.2 
1990   12.6    11.5     5.9     5.6     10.1 
1991   14.7    14.0     5.6   10.0       8.0 
1992   17.0    19.9     5.0   10.8       4.5 
1993   11.6    22.4     3.3     8.1   -11.9 
19   94   22.9    32.1     8.9   10.4       5.2 
*Data for China-Taiwan and China-Korea unavailable. 
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. 
 
 
Table 8b. Greater China* Merchandise Trade Balance with Major  
     Trading  Partners 
  Greater China's Trade Balance (in US$ billions) with: 
Ye   ar      US   Japan    EU   World 
1982        8.3     -4.1  2.8      3.6 
1983      12.0     -6.9  2.9      3.6 
1984      17.3     -9.7  2.5      7.0 
1985       19.6   -13.5  -0.6     -4.2 
1986       24.3    -13.5  1.8      3.8 
1987       28.9    -12.5  5.6     15.3 
1988       23.6    -14.8  7.5      2.5 
1989       25.3    -13.1  8.3      8.8 
1990    27.0   -12.0  12.7     21.4 
1991    26.7   -17.4  18.6     19.3 
1992    31.7   -25.4  16.7       8.9 
1993    35.1   -30.0    9.9     -7.7 
19   94    41.6   -27.8    9.1       1.8 
*"Greater China" refers to China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong taken together. 
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 